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The aim of this paper is to explain why some em-
ployers pay their employees an oicial declared wage 
and an additional undeclared (“envelope”) wage, and 
how this illegal practice can be tackled. Employers do-
ing so have been conventionally explained as rational 
economic actors who pay envelope wages when the 
pay-of is greater than the expected cost of being 
caught and punished (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). 
The policy solution is therefore to increase the actual 
or perceived penalties and probability of detection. 
However, over the past decade, drawing inspiration 
from institutional theory (North 1990), an alternative 
explanation has emerged. A social actor approach 
explains salary under-reporting to result from em-
ployers lack of “vertical trust”, measured by a non-
alignment between their norms, values and beliefs, 
and the laws and regulations of the formal institutions 
(Alm et al. 2010, 2012; Cummings et al. 2009; Kirchler 
2007; Murphy 2008; Torgler 2007, 2012; Williams and 
Horodnic 2015a,b, 2016a,b). Recently, furthermore, 
this social actor approach has additionally begun to 
assert that employers pay envelope wages when they 
lack horizontal trust that other employers are operat-
ing in a compliant manner (Baric 2016). The solution 
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is therefore to improve vertical and horizontal trust. In 
this paper, the intention is to evaluate these compet-
ing ways of explaining and tackling under-declared 
employment. 
This paper therefore seeks to advance theory in 
three ways. First, most studies explaining under-de-
clared employment have focused upon employees’ ra-
tionales. This paper evaluates employers’ reasons, who 
are the ones deciding to pay envelope wages. Second, 
by evaluating the rational economic actor and social 
actor perspectives, it advances considerably how to 
explain employers paying envelope wages by high-
lighting that they are more social actors, lacking ver-
tical trust, rather than rational economic actors. And 
third and importantly for advancing institutional the-
ory, it will reveal the importance of horizontal trust as 
an explanation for employers paying envelope wages. 
This has so far received little attention in institutional 
theory. 
To advance understanding of how participation in 
under-declared employment can be explained and 
tackled, therefore, section 2 reviews the previous lit-
erature on the extent and nature of under-declared 
employment, and the competing views on how it can 
be explained and tackled. The outcome is a set of hy-
potheses. To test these, section 3 then reports the data 
used, namely the 2015 GREY survey of employers in 
FYR Macedonia, involving 450 face-to-face interviews. 
Section 4 reports the indings regarding the validity of 
the diferent ways of explaining and tackling under-
declared employment, while section 5 summarises 
the theoretical and policy implications. 
 EXPLAINING AND TACKLING UNDER-
DECLARED EMPLOYMENT: REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Since the turn of the millennium, it has been rec-
ognised that formal employers sometimes evade pay-
ing the full tax and social contributions they owe for 
their formal employees by using the illegal practice 
of paying them an undeclared (“envelope”) wage in 
addition to their oicial declared wage (Horodnic 
2016; Meriküll and Staehr 2010; Neef 2002; Williams 
2007, 2008a, 2009a,b). This normally happens at the 
job interview stage via a verbal agreement which 
supersedes the formal written contract (Chavdarova 
2014; Williams 2009a; Williams and Horodnic 2017a,b; 
Woolfson 2007). Sometimes employers impose ad-
ditional conditions. These might include that the 
employee: does not take their full statutory entitle-
ment to annual leave; works longer hours than in 
their formal contract, and/or does diferent tasks and 
responsibilities to that speciied in their formal con-
tract (Williams and Horodnic 2017a,b).
Many of the earlier studies evaluating the pre-
valance and nature of under-declared employment 
were small-scale qualitative studies in East-Central 
European nations, such as Bulgaria (Chavdarova 2014), 
Estonia (Meriküll and Staehr 2010), Latvia (Meriküll 
and Staehr 2010; OECD 2003; Sedlenieks 2003), 
Lithuania (Meriküll and Staehr 2010; Woolfson 2007), 
Romania (Neef 2002), Russia (Williams and Round 
2008) and Ukraine (Round, Williams and Rodgers 2008; 
Williams 2007). For instance, the study in Lithuania 
by Woolfson (2007) is an in-depth case study of one 
person. Meanwhile, although the Ukraine study cov-
ers 600 households, it is limited to three localities 
(Williams 2007), while the Russia study is conined to 
313 households in three districts of Moscow (Williams 
and Round 2007). 
Despite not being nationally representative sam-
ples, these studies nevertheless provide clues to its 
prevalence. For example, in Ukraine, 30 per cent of for-
mal employees reported being paid an additional en-
velope wage (Williams 2007), 65 per cent in Moscow 
(Williams and Round 2007) and 19.5 per cent, 16.3 per 
cent and 7.2 per cent in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania 
respectively in 1998 and 9.6 per cent, 22.5 per cent 
and 11.7 per cent respectively in 2002 (Meriküll and 
Staehr 2010). However, all these surveys were con-
ducted at the height of the transition process in post-
socialist societies. 
The irst extensive representative survey on a cross-
national level of the prevalence and distribution of un-
der-declared employment was a 2007 Eurobarometer 
survey involving 11,135 interviews with formal em-
ployees across the 27 member states of the European 
Union (EU). Analyses of this dataset reveal the preva-
lence of wage under-reporting across the EU as a whole 
(Williams 2009a; Williams and Padmore 2013a,b), as 
well as in South-Eastern Europe (Williams 2010, 2012a; 
Williams et al. 2011), the Baltic region (Williams 2009d) 
and East-Central Europe (Williams 2008a,b, 2009b,c, 
2012b; Williams and Round 2008). Across the EU, 5.5 
per cent of formal employees were found to receive 
under-reported wages, amounting on average to 43 
per cent of their gross wage, with its prevalence much 
lower in Western and Nordic nations than in Southern 
and East-Central Europe, as was the share of the 
gross wage received as an envelope wage lower (e.g., 
Williams 2009a, 2013). This Eurobarometer survey was 
repeated in 2013 with 11,025 dependent employees 
across the 28 member states of the EU, revealing that 
one in 33 employees receive under-reported wages 
with similar variations continuing to persist across the 
EU regions (Williams and Horodnic 2017a). 
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All these studies, however, are based on interviews 
with employees. This is important. Overall, it is em-
ployers, rather than employees, who decide whether 
an employee should be paid an envelope wage, and 
it is employers, not employees, who are penalised 
if caught (Williams 2018). As such, it is important to 
understand employers’ perspectives since they are 
the ones deciding to pay envelope wages, not the 
employees who are more passive recipients of such 
an employment relationship. Indeed, this is similarly 
the case in FYR Macedonia, which is the focus of this 
paper. Only employees have been so far surveyed 
(Mojsoska Blazevski and Williams 2018; Williams and 
Bezeredi 2018), not employers who are the ones de-
ciding to pay envelope wages. The aim of this paper, 
therefore, is to explain why employers pay envelope 
wages and how employers can be prevented from 
doing so.    
Until now, the dominant view has been that em-
ployers are “rational economic actors” who pay enve-
lope wages when the beneits are greater than the 
costs. This perspective has its roots in the seminal work 
of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) on tax non-compli-
ance. If the beneits from evading payment of the full 
tax and social contributions owed is greater than the 
perceived and/or actual costs, then employers will do 
so. The policy approach is therefore to ensure that the 
costs outweigh the beneits. This is achieved by in-
creasing the actual and/or the perceived probability 
of detection and/or level of penalties. Indeed, this is 
currently the main policy approach pursued by gov-
ernments across the European Union (EU) and beyond 
(Williams and Puts 2017; ILO 2017). This is also the 
dominant policy approach in FYR Macedonia. The tax 
administration and labour inspectorate have sought 
to tackle under-declared employment by increasing 
the penalties and probability of detection to ensure 
that the costs outweigh the beneits. The amend-
ment of the Law on Labour Relations (Oicial Gazette 
of the Republic of Macedonia No. 54/2013) increased 
the penalties for such wage under-reporting to €7,000 
and the risks of detection have been improved, not 
least through strengthened administrative coopera-
tion via electronic data exchange, as well as by pursu-
ing targeted inspections in high-risk sectors (Mojsoska 
Blazevski and Williams 2018).
However, despite the widespread adoption of this 
rational economic actor approach by governments, 
the evidence that increasing the penalties and prob-
ability of detection leads to compliance is less than 
conclusive. Some studies conirm that compliance 
is signiicantly higher when the levels of penalties 
and risks of detection are higher (Feld and Frey 2002; 
Mas’ud et al. 2015; Mazzolini et al. 2017), others ind 
no signiicant association (Hartl et al. 2015; Shaw et al. 
2008; Williams and Franic 2015, 2016), and yet others 
that non-compliance increases (Chang and Lai 2004; 
Hofmann et al. 2017; Kaplanoglou and Rapano, 2015; 
Murphy 2005, 2008; Murphy and Harris 2007). A prob-
lem speciic to salary under-reporting, moreover, is 
that this practice is di cult for tax and labour inspec-
tors to detect. These are formal employees with a for-
mal written contract working for a formal employer 
and the additional contract is verbal. Despite being 
di cult to detect and even more so to prove, this ap-
proach remains dominant. To evaluate the validity of 
this rational economic actor approach in explaining 
and tackling under-declared employment, therefore, 
the following hypotheses can be tested:
Rational economic actor hypothesis (H1): the higher 
are the perceived penalties and risks of detection, 
the lower is the likelihood of employers paying en-
velope wages.
 H1a: the higher are the perceived penalties, 
the lower is the likelihood of employers paying en-
velope wages.
 H1b: the higher are the perceived risks of de-
tection, the lower is the likelihood of employers 
paying envelope wages.
The recognition that many employers do not pay 
envelope wages even when the beneit/cost ratio sug-
gests they should so (Alm et al. 2010; Kirchler 2007; 
Murphy 2008; Murphy and Harris 2007; Windebank 
and Horodnic 2017) has led to the emergence of an 
alternative “social actor” explanation. Drawing inspi-
ration from institutional theory (Helmke and Levistky 
2004; North 1990), all societies are viewed as having 
formal institutions, which are laws and regulations de-
ining the legal rules of the game, and informal institu-
tions, which are the “socially shared rules, usually un-
written, that are created, communicated and enforced 
outside of oicially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004, 727). Under-declared employment is 
asserted to occur when there is a lack of vertical trust 
(measured by the non-alignment of the formal and in-
formal institutions). This lack of vertical trust in South-
East Europe might arise for example due to a percep-
tion of widespread public-sector corruption (Aralica et 
al. 2018; Williams et al. 2017). When this vertical trust is 
lower, the prevalence of under-declared employment 
is asserted to be higher. 
Analysing employees’ views of the formal rules of 
the game, this has been conirmed. A statistically sig-
niicant relationship has been identiied between the 
level of vertical trust and receiving envelope wages 
(Williams and Horodnic 2015a, 2017a,b). Until now, 
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however, the only employer surveys to have investi-
gated this issue have identiied a link between wage 
underreporting and tolerance to tax evasion. However, 
these have been conducted in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania (Putniņš and Sauka 2017) and Romania and 
Moldova (Putniņš et al. 2018). Whether this is more 
widely the case, therefore, especially in South-Eastern 
Europe, needs to be investigated.
In the past few years, furthermore, it has been as-
serted to be not just the lack of vertical trust (i.e., 
formal/informal institutional asymmetry) that leads 
to salary under-reporting, but also the lack of hori-
zontal trust that others are being compliant (Baric 
2016). When employers perceive a large majority of 
their competitors as not adhering to the formal rules 
of the game, the argument is that they decide to also 
be non-compliant. Indeed, the lower the level of hori-
zontal trust (i.e., the greater the perceived propensity 
of other employers to be non-compliant), the greater 
will be likelihood that employers will be themselves 
non-compliant. To evaluate the validity of this social 
actor approach towards explaining and tackling un-
der-declared employment, therefore, the following 
hypothesis can be evaluated:
Social actor hypothesis (H2): the greater the level of 
vertical and horizontal trust, the lower is the likeli-
hood of employers paying envelope wages.
 H2a: the greater is the level of vertical trust, 
the lower is the likelihood of employers paying en-
velope wages.
 H2b: the greater the level of horizontal trust, 
the lower is the likelihood of employers paying en-
velope wages.
 DATA AND VARIABLES
 Data
To evaluate these two contrasting ways of explain-
ing and tackling under-declared employment, data 
is reported from a representative employers’ survey 
conducted in 2015 in FYR Macedonia, a country with 
one of the highest levels of undeclared work in Europe 
(Medina and Schneider 2018). Indeed, recent stud-
ies reveal that undeclared work is far more prevalent 
across South-East Europe than in the EU (Efendic and 
Williams 2018; Gashi and Williams 2018; Katnic and 
Williams 2018; Kosta and Williams 2018; Radulovic and 
Williams 2018). The sampling methodology ensured 
that the samples are proportionate to the universe in 
the country with respect to irm size, region and sec-
tor. The owners or managers of a representative sam-
ple of 450 businesses were surveyed. 
Given the sensitive topic, and to build up rapport 
with the participants, the survey adopted a gradual 
approach to the more sensitive questions. The inter-
view schedule commenced by asking the employers 
about their satisfaction with the business environ-
ment, followed by questions on the acceptability of 
some uncompliant behaviours and only then ques-
tions regarding whether they consider they are af-
fected by the existence of the businesses which em-
ploy informal practices and their engagement in such 
practices, including under-declared employment. 
Examining the responses of the interviewers regard-
ing their perceived reliability of the interviews, in 94 
per cent of cases, interviewers reported excellent or 
fair cooperation from the employers. Cooperation was 
bad, or the interviewer did not assess the perceived 
reliability of the interviews in only 1 per cent of cases. 
 Variables
To evaluate the hypotheses, we here use ordered 
logit regression analysis. The dependent variable is 
a categorical variable showing how often employers 
hire an employee on a contract with “hidden clauses, 
that is, social insurance and tax contributions are paid 
based on for example the minimum wage, whilst the 
rest of the pay is paid undeclared, without a payslip”: 1 
= never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = in most cases, 4 = always. 
To analyse whether there is an association between 
employers paying envelope wages, and the two types 
of policy approach, four key explanatory variables are 
used. On the one hand, the two variables investigat-
ing the elements of the “rational economic actor” ap-
proach are: 
 – Detection risk: A categorical variable describing re-
spondent’s estimation about the probability that 
the typical company in his/her industry would be 
caught if the company was to underreport the 
amount it pays to employees in salaries: 1 = less 
than 30%, 2 = 30 to 60%, 3 = more than 60%.
 – Expected sanction: A categorical variable measur-
ing anticipated penalties when the company were 
caught for deliberately misreporting: 1 = nothing 
serious or a small ine, 2 = a serious ine that would 
afect the competitiveness of the company, 3 = a 
serious ine that would put the company at risk of 
insolvency, 4 = the company would be forced to 
cease operations.
On the other hand, the two variables investigating 
the vertical and horizontal trust elements respectively 
of the “social actor” approach are: 
 – Tax morale: A categorical variable recorded using 
the following survey question - To what extent do 
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you agree with the statements that underreporting 
annual revenue or turnover to evade taxes is accept-
able. This variable is measured on a 10-point Likert 
scale, 1 means completely disagree, 10 means com-
pletely agree. Thus, the lower the tax morale index 
value, the higher is the tax morale, and vice versa
 – Estimated share: A categorical variable describing 
the respondent’s estimation of the overall share of 
the undeclared economy in his/her country: 1=less 
than 10%, 2=10 to 20%, 3=21 to 30%, 4=31 to 50%, 
5=50% or more.
A series of individual-level and irm-level variables 
derived from previous studies analysing the likeli-
hood of participation in the informal economy (Ali 
and Najman, 2018; Hudson et al. 2012; Putniņš and 
Sauka 2017; Putniņš et al. 2018; Williams and Horodnic 
2017a,b) are used as control variables as detailed 
below.
 – Sector: A categorical variable describing the main 
activity of the company: 1 = agriculture, 2 = hotels 
and restaurants, 3 = services, 4 = construction, 5 = 
transport and communications, 6 = trade, 7 = retail, 
8 = industry, 9 = health, 10 = other.
 – Number of employees: A categorical variable de-
scribing the total number of currently employed 
people in the observed company (excluding own-
ers and partners): 1 = sole proprietor’s and micro 
(0-9 employees), 2 = small (10-49 employees), 3 = 
medium and large (50+ employees).
 – Status business: A categorical variable describing 
the legal status of observed company: 1 = sole pro-
prietorship, 2 = private limited company, limited 
by shares (LTD.), 3 = public Ltd Company (PLC), 4 
= other.
 – Age business: A categorical variable showing how 
many years has the observed company been trad-
ing (this includes under all ownerships and all legal 
statuses): 1 = less than 5 years, 2 = 6-10 years, 3 = 
11-20 years, 4 = more than 20 years.
 – Business locality: A categorical variable describing 
in what kind of locality does the observed company 
carry out its main activity: 1 = the capital, 2 = big 
city (regional centre), 3 = small town, 4 = village or 
rural area, 5 = the entire country, 6 = both inside 
the country and outside the country, or outside the 
country only.
 – Vat registered: A dummy variable describing wheth-
er the respondent’s company is VAT registered: 0 = 
no, 1 = yes.
For the descriptive analysis we report the crude 
data for each variable to provide an accurate descrip-
tion and to minimise the bias that one would encoun-
ter by excluding those employers who did not provide 
responses to all the variables in the analysis but pro-
vided responses for some questions. In the regression 
analysis, on the other hand, only those respondents 
for which data on each variable was available for each 
model were analysed due to the technical require-
ments of this type of analysis
 RESULTS
Examining the employers interviewed, 35.1 per 
cent never paid envelope wages, 38.0 per cent some-
times did so, 22.9 per cent in most cases did so, and 
4.0 per cent always did so (see Table 1). This displays 
how commonly employers pay an additional unde-
clared (envelope) wage in FYR Macedonia.  
However, not all types of employer were equally 
likely to pay envelope wages. Examining those em-
ployers who in most cases or always pay envelope 
wages (i.e., the last two columns of Table 1), the ind-
ing is that employers in the agriculture, construction, 
Table 1:  Use of under-declared employment by employers when hiring employees
Never Sometimes In most cases Always
Total 35.1 38.0 22.9 4.0
Sector
Agriculture 26.7 33.3 40.0 0.0
Hotels and restaurants 22.2 63.0 11.1 3.7
Services 42.9 32.7 20.4 4.1
Construction 25.0 41.7 16.7 16.7
Transport and communications 50.0 29.4 17.7 2.9
Trade 18.3 40.9 39.4 1.4
Retail 28.4 40.3 23.9 7.5
Industry 53.3 26.7 17.8 2.2
Health 55.6 37.0 7.4 0.0
Other 41.2 41.2 17.7 0.0
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Table 1:  Continued
Number of employees
Sole traders and micro (0-9 employees) 34.0 39.2 22.9 3.9
Small (10-49 employees) 33.3 33.3 27.3 6.1
Medium and large (50+ employees) 72.7 18.2 9.1 0.0
Status business
Sole proprietorship 11.1 42.9 39.7 6.4
Private limited company, limited by shares (LTD.) 37.3 37.7 20.7 4.5
Public Ltd Company (PLC) 40.5 43.2 16.2 0.0
Other 44.4 33.3 22.2 0.0
Age business
Less than 5 years 32.5 36.3 23.8 7.5
6 - 10 years 41.3 30.3 24.8 3.7
11 - 20 years 29.5 48.4 20.5 1.6
More than 20 years 39.7 33.3 22.2 4.8
Estimated share
Less than 10% 61.3 29.0 9.7 0.0
10 to 20% 44.6 36.5 17.6 1.4
21 to 30% 45.0 36.3 16.3 2.5
31 to 50% 27.7 42.6 26.6 3.2
50% or more 18.6 39.2 33.0 9.3
Business locality
The capital 48.3 31.7 16.7 3.3
Big city (regional centre) 37.2 38.3 20.9 3.6
Small town 21.9 39.1 34.4 4.7
Village or rural area 27.3 18.2 45.5 9.1
The entire country 26.9 46.2 19.2 7.7
Both inside the country and outside the coun-
try, or outside the country only
31.6 52.6 15.8 0.0
Vat registered
No 32.3 40.3 24.2 3.2
Yes 35.0 38.0 22.7 4.3
Tax morale
1 and 2 35.8 39.5 21.6 3.2
3 and 4 44.4 40.7 14.8 0.0
5 and 6 24.5 37.7 28.3 9.4
7 and 8 12.5 41.7 37.5 8.3
9 and 10 20.0 26.7 46.7 6.7
Detection risk
Less than 30% 40.0 32.3 23.1 4.6
30 to 60% 30.1 43.7 22.3 3.9
More than 60% 34.1 39.9 22.5 3.6
Expected sanction
Nothing serious or a small ine 34.0 34.0 25.5 6.4
A serious ine that would afect the competitive-
ness of the company
30.6 41.0 26.6 1.7
A serious ine that would put the company at risk 
of insolvency
48.8 34.2 12.2 4.9
The company would be forced to cease 
operations
25.9 44.4 22.2 7.4
Source:  Authors’ own work based on the GREY Survey in FYROM
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trade and retail sectors are far more likely than those 
in the health, or hotel and restaurants industries to 
pay envelope wages. So too are envelope wages more 
likely in smaller businesses, sole proprietorship busi-
nesses, and in small towns and villages or rural areas. 
Analysing the competing explanations and policy 
approaches, Table 1 irstly reveals in relation to the ra-
tional economic actor approach that there does not 
appear to be any strong correlation between whether 
employers pay envelope wages and their perception 
of the risk of detection. Similarly, there is no clear re-
lationship between whether employers pay envelope 
wages and their perceptions of the expected sanction. 
Although those who perceive the sanction to be noth-
ing serious or a small ine are more likely to pay enve-
lope wages always or in most cases than those who 
believe that a serious ine would result that would put 
the company at risk of insolvency, those who believe 
that their company would be forced to cease trading 
are surprisingly just as likely as those who say that 
there would be no serious ine. 
Examining whether the likelihood of employers 
paying envelope wages always or in most cases is cor-
related with the levels of vertical and horizontal trust, 
Table 1 irstly reveals that the greater the adherence 
of employers to the formal rules of the game (i.e., the 
laws and regulations), the less likely are they to al-
ways or in most cases pay envelope wages. This ap-
pears to be strongly correlated. Similarly, those who 
estimate the share of the undeclared economy in FYR 
Macedonia as higher are markedly more likely to in 
most cases or always pay envelope wages. Some 42.3 
per cent of those who perceive the undeclared econo-
my to be 50 per cent or more of GDP always or in most 
cases pay envelope wages compared with just 9.7 per 
cent of those who perceive the undeclared economy 
to be less than 10 per cent of GDP.
These, however, are descriptive statistics. They do 
not hold constant the other variables which may inlu-
ence these correlations. To do so, Table 2 presents an 
ordered logit regression analysis. This adopts a staged 
approach. The issue of horizontal trust is included in all 
the models along with the control variables. Model 1 
adds the inluence of vertical trust, model 2 the risk of 
detection, model 3 the expected sanction and model 
4 includes all these explanatory factors. Before exam-
ining the correlation between these explanations for 
employers being more likely to pay envelope wages, 
it is irst necessary to examine the types of business 
more likely to pay envelope wages when all other vari-
ables are held constant.
Table 2 reveals similar results across all models. 
Compared with the construction industry, manufac-
turing irms and the health sector are signiicantly 
less likely to pay envelope wages to their employees. 
Why this is the case needs to be analysed in future 
qualitative research on the construction industry. This 
could test whether it is due to the traditions of under-
declared work in this sector, whether it is due to the 
more lexible employment relations in this sector, 
the intense price pressures put on sub-contractors to 
minimise wage costs, and so forth. However, just be-
cause envelope wages are more prevalent in the con-
struction sector than in the manufacturing and the 
health sectors, does not mean that a sector-speciic 
approach should be adopted by state enforcement 
authorities. As Table 2 reveals, envelope wages are not 
signiicantly more prevalent in the construction sector 
compared with many other sectors, and as Table 1 re-
veals, such envelope wages prevail in all sectors of the 
economy. A sector-speciic approach, therefore, does 
not appear the way forward. 
Turning to the irms of diferent legal types, com-
pared with sole proprietors, private limited companies 
and public limited companies are signiicantly less 
likely to pay envelope wages. This is possibly due to 
the relative absence of a formal human resource man-
agement function in such businesses. The age and 
size of the business, however, is not signiicantly asso-
ciated with the likelihood of paying envelope wages. 
Employers in small towns, however, are signiicantly 
less likely to employ workers on envelope wages than 
those in the capital city of Skopje, suggesting that 
state resources to tackle envelope wages might be 
relatively concentrated in Skopje.
To evaluate the rational economic actor explana-
tion and policy approach, it can be seen in models 2 
and 4 that there is no strong signiicant association 
between the likelihood of employers paying envelope 
wages and the risk of detection (refuting Hypothesis 
H1b). Meanwhile, models 3 and 4 display a weak but 
signiicant correlation between the likelihood of em-
ployers paying envelope wages and the level of pen-
alties. Employers who perceive a serious ine would 
be imposed that would put the company at risk of 
insolvency are signiicantly less likely to pay envelope 
wages than those perceiving the sanction as nothing 
serious or a small ine (conirming hypothesis H1a). An 
employer who believes that the sanction is a serious 
ine that would put the company at risk of insolven-
cy for deliberately misreporting has a 2.7 percentage 
points lower probability of always paying envelope 
wages than employers who believe that the company 
would receive nothing serious or a small ine for delib-
erately misreporting.
Secondly, and evaluating the social actor expla-
nation, there is irstly a strong signiicant association 
between the level of vertical trust and the likelihood 
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Table 2:  Estimation results from the ordered logit regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeicient 
(Standard 
error)
Marginal 
efect 
Coeicient 
(Standard 
error)
Marginal 
efect
Coeicient 
(Standard 
error)
Marginal 
efect
Coeicient 
(Standard 
error)
Marginal 
efect 
Sector  
(RC: Construction)
Agriculture
 0.111 
(0.672)
 0.006
 0.212 
(0.667)
 0.011
 0.199 
(0.668)
 0.010
 0.336 
(0.686)
 0.018
Hotels and 
restaurants
-0.387 
(0.592)
-0.018
-0.200 
(0.593)
-0.009
-0.212 
(0.581)
-0.009
-0.305 
(0.604)
-0.012
Services
-0.235 
(0.533)
-0.011
-0.053 
(0.539)
-0.002
-0.033 
(0.531)
-0.002
 0.080 
(0.560)
 0.004
Transport and 
communications
-0.854 
(0.575)
-0.033
-0.738 
(0.573)
-0.026
-0.923 
(0.575)
-0.030
-0.703 
(0.593)
-0.024
Trade
 0.003 
(0.490)
 0.000
 0.178 
(0.487)
 0.009
 0.131 
(0.491)
 0.006
 0.190 
(0.502)
 0.009
Retail
-0.303 
(0.512)
-0.014
-0.122 
(0.511)
-0.005
-0.123 
(0.515)
-0.005
-0.113 
(0.525)
-0.005
Industry
-1.440 
(0.568)**
-0.045
-1.356 
(0.572)**
-0.038
-1.283 
(0.566)**
-0.036
-1.108 
(0.599)*
-0.033
Health
-1.450 
(0.740)**
-0.045
-1.149 
(0.718)
-0.034
-1.071 
(0.723)
-0.033
-1.265 
(0.742)*
-0.035
Other
-0.436 
(0.824)
-0.020
-0.280 
(0.816)
-0.012
-0.188 
(0.831)
-0.008
-0.027 
(0.852)
-0.001
Number of employees 
(RC: Sole traders and 
micro (0-9 employees))
Small (10-49 
employees)
 0.615 
(0.393)
 0.030
 0.566 
(0.392)
 0.027
 0.759 
(0.394)*
 0.038
 0.612 
(0.404)
 0.030
Medium and large 
(50+ employees)
-0.482 
(0.800)
-0.015
-0.429 
(0.777)
-0.013
-0.269 
(0.771)
-0.009
-0.509 
(0.822)
-0.016
Status business (RC: 
Sole proprietorship)
Private limited 
company, limited 
by shares (LTD.)
-0.542 
(0.315)*
-0.024
-0.649 
(0.313)**
-0.029
-0.622 
(0.313)**
-0.027
-0.426 
(0.323)
-0.018
Public Ltd Company 
(PLC)
-0.743 
(0.440)*
-0.030
-0.899 
(0.442)**
-0.036
-0.955 
(0.44)**
-0.037
-0.817 
(0.452)*
-0.030
Other
 0.148 
(0.721)
 0.008
-0.244 
(0.687)
-0.013
-0.319 
(0.693)
-0.016
 0.175 
(0.721)
 0.010
Age business (RC: 
Less than 5 years)
6 - 10 years
-0.460 
(0.313)
-0.019
-0.349 
(0.310)
-0.014
-0.305 
(0.308)
-0.012
-0.420 
(0.318)
-0.017
11 - 20 years
-0.205 
(0.306)
-0.009
-0.179 
(0.305)
-0.008
-0.163 
(0.304)
-0.007
-0.164 
(0.311)
-0.007
More than 20 years
-0.434 
(0.355)
-0.018
-0.385 
(0.360)
-0.015
-0.412 
(0.351)
-0.016
-0.380 
(0.363)
-0.015
Estimated share (RC: 
50% or more)
Less than 10%
-2.072 
(0.475)***
-0.069
-2.445 
(0.487)***
-0.079
-2.176 
(0.469)***
-0.073
-2.178 
(0.502)***
-0.071
10 to 20%
-1.106 
(0.349)***
-0.052
-1.338 
(0.342)***
-0.062
-1.283 
(0.340)***
-0.058
-1.149 
(0.351)***
-0.053
Explaining and tackling under-declared employment in FYR Macedonia: the employers perspective
27South East European Journal of Economics and Business,  Volume 13 (2) 2018
21 to 30%
-1.286 
(0.337)***
-0.056
-1.473 
(0.336)***
-0.065
-1.423 
(0.336)***
-0.061
-1.365 
(0.341)***
-0.058
31 to 50%
-0.871 
(0.302)***
-0.044
-0.893 
(0.301)***
-0.049
-0.886 
(0.299)***
-0.046
-0.847 
(0.305)***
-0.044
Business locality  
(RC: Small town)
The capital
-0.917 
(0.441)**
-0.034
-0.801 
(0.433)*
-0.031
-0.832 
(0.430)*
-0.030
-0.958 
(0.450)**
-0.035
Big city (regional 
centre)
-0.480 
(0.299)
-0.021
-0.488 
(0.305)
-0.021
-0.421 
(0.300)
-0.018
-0.448 
(0.313)
-0.020
Village or rural area
-0.115 
(0.642)
-0.006
-0.109 
(0.646)
-0.006
 0.021 
(0.638)
 0.001
-0.117 
(0.654)
-0.006
The entire country
-0.046 
(0.500)
-0.002
-0.244 
(0.514)
-0.012
-0.118 
(0.501)
-0.006
-0.112 
(0.522)
-0.006
Both inside the 
country and out-
side the country, or 
outside the country 
only
-0.513 
(0.547)
-0.022
-0.571 
(0.545)
-0.024
-0.571 
(0.548)
-0.023
-0.572 
(0.553)
-0.024
Vat registered
-0.026 
(0.291)
-0.001
 0.061 
(0.293)
 0.002
 0.050 
(0.287)
 0.002
-0.039 
(0.300)
-0.002
Tax morale
 0.119 
(0.046)***
 0.005
 0.126 
(0.048)***
 0.005
Detection risk  
(RC: Less than 30%)
30 to 60%
-0.351 
(0.272)
-0.014
-0.329 
(0.276)
-0.013
More than 60%
-0.175 
(0.270)
-0.007
-0.153 
(0.278)
-0.006
Expected sanction 
(RC: Nothing serious 
or a small ine)
A serious ine that 
would afect the 
competitiveness of 
the company
-0.375 
(0.266)
-0.016
-0.311 
(0.271)
-0.013
A serious ine that 
would put the 
company at risk of 
insolvency
-0.736 
(0.333)**
-0.027
-0.607 
(0.347)*
-0.023
The company 
would be forced to 
cease operations
-0.305 
(0.437)
-0.013
-0.241 
(0.463)
-0.011
Number of 
observations
345 350 355 340
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.098 0.101 0.103
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: “Hiring an employee under contract with hidden clauses” measured on a four-point scale (1=Never; 
2=Sometimes; 3=In most cases; 4=Always)
(2) We report the marginal efects for the highest score of the dependent variable (4)
(3) The lower the tax morale index value, the higher is the tax morale, and vice versa
(4) Signiicance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Source: Authors’ own work based on the GREY Survey in FYROM
Table 2:  Continued
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of employers paying envelope wages. The lower the 
level of vertical trust (measured by employers’ toler-
ance of those who engage in the undeclared econo-
my, or what is here called tax morale), the signiicantly 
greater is the likelihood of the employer always pay-
ing envelope wages (conirming Hypothesis H2a). An 
increase in the tax morale index by one unit increases 
the share of employers always hiring workers on enve-
lope wages by 0.5 percentage points. 
Similarly, it is shown across all models that there 
is a strong signiicant association between the level 
of horizontal trust and the likelihood of employers al-
ways paying envelope wages. The lower the level of 
horizontal trust (measured by the employers estimate 
of the share of the informal economy in the country), 
the signiicantly greater is the likelihood of the em-
ployer always paying envelope wages (conirming 
Hypothesis H2b). An employer who estimates that less 
than 10 per cent of work in the country is in the in-
formal economy has around a 6-7 percentage points 
lower probability of always employing under-declared 
workers than employers who estimates that greater 
than 50 per cent of work is in the informal economy. 
It is also important to recognise that model 4, which 
includes all the independent variables, has a better 
goodness-of-it (as measured by the pseudo R2 value) 
compared with the other models. 
 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
To explain why employers’ pay envelope wages 
and how this illegal employment practice can be 
tackled, this paper has evaluated two perspectives, 
namely a rational economic actor explanation which 
views employers as paying envelope wages when the 
beneits outweigh the costs, and an emergent social 
actor approach which explains employers as paying 
envelope wages when they lack both vertical trust 
(i.e., their norms, values and beliefs are not in symme-
try with the laws and regulations) and horizontal trust 
(i.e., they believe many others are being non-compli-
ant). Reporting a 2015 survey of 450 employers in FYR 
Macedonia, the inding is that there is no association 
between employers paying envelope wages and the 
perceived risk of detection, and only a weak signii-
cant association with the perceived level of penalties. 
However, there is a strong signiicant association with 
both the level of vertical and horizontal trust. Those 
employers whose norms difer to the laws and regula-
tions, display a signiicantly greater likelihood of pay-
ing envelope wages, as do those who perceive a larger 
proportion of the population to be engaged in the un-
declared economy. 
In terms of theoretical implications, therefore, this 
paper makes three advances. First, most studies ex-
plaining under-declared employment have focused 
upon employees’ rationales and few have evaluated 
employers’ reasons when theorising under-declared 
employment. This paper has illed this lacuna in 
South-Eastern Europe. Given that employers decide 
to pay envelope wages, explaining their rationales 
is important if under-declared employment is to be 
theorised. Second, this paper refutes the view of em-
ployers as rational economic actors and conirms the 
view that they are social actors and the usefulness of 
an institutional theory lens. The inding is that there is 
no association between employers paying envelope 
wages and the perceived risk of detection, and only 
a weak signiicant association with the level of pen-
alties, but a strong association between vertical trust 
and under-declared employment. The greater the 
degree of asymmetry between the laws and regula-
tions of formal institutions and the norms, values and 
beliefs of employers, the greater is the prevalence of 
under-declared employment. Third and inally, and 
importantly for further advancing institutional theory, 
a strong association is identiied between horizontal 
trust and the likelihood of employers paying envelope 
wages. Theoretically, therefore, this displays the need 
to extend the scope of analysis of institutional theo-
ry beyond its current focus upon solely vertical trust 
when explaining under-declared employment and to 
include also horizontal trust when explaining employ-
ers’ decision to pay envelope wages. 
In terms of policy implications therefore, the ind-
ing is that tackling under-declared employment re-
quires a shift away from viewing employers primarily 
as rational economic actors. Increasing the risk of de-
tection, even if this was feasible to do cost efectively, 
is not related to the propensity to pay envelope wag-
es, and even if increasing the penalties is signiicantly 
related to the propensity for employers to pay enve-
lope wages, it is a weak association. Instead, there is a 
need to recognise that employers are primarily social 
actors. A strong signiicant association exists between 
employers paying envelope wages and their lack of 
both vertical trust (i.e., their norms, values and beliefs 
do not align with the formal laws and regulations) and 
horizontal trust (i.e., they believe many other employ-
ers are paying envelope wages). To tackle under-de-
clared employment, therefore, increasing the level of 
deterrents will have little impact, while measures that 
improve the social contract between the government 
and employers (i.e., improving vertical trust) will have 
a signiicant impact. On the one hand, this can be 
achieved by changing employers’ norms, values and 
beliefs regarding the acceptability of paying envelope 
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wages, using education and awareness raising cam-
paigns. However, it is unlikely that this will be efective 
unless formal institutions themselves change. On the 
other hand, therefore, there is also a need to change 
the formal institutions, such as by reducing the level 
of public sector corruption and improving procedural 
and distributive justice and fairness (Horodnic 2018; 
Horodnic and Williams 2018; Molero and Pujol 2012; 
Murphy 2005; Williams and Horodnic 2015a). There is 
also a need to improve horizontal trust. To do so, in-
formation on their peers might be provided to em-
ployers. Many employers believe that the undeclared 
economy is larger than most measurements suggest. 
Governments, therefore, could actively publicise the 
high level of employer compliance. Studies of UK tax-
payers reveal that such messages have a strong sig-
niicant impact on increasing compliance (Hallsworth 
et al. 2017). 
Despite these theoretical and policy implications, 
this paper nevertheless has its limitations. First, it is 
based on just one country. Future studies, therefore, 
should evaluate whether similar indings are iden-
tiied when conducting employer surveys in other 
countries. Second, and importantly, although this 
study reveals that the propensity of employers to 
pay envelope wages is signiicantly associated with 
their levels of vertical and horizontal trust, it does not 
uncover the reasons for this lack of vertical and hori-
zontal trust. Future quantitative as well as in-depth 
qualitative research could be conducted, therefore, 
to discover these reasons, including the formal insti-
tutions in which there are low levels of vertical trust 
which lead to envelope wages being paid, and why a 
lack of horizontal trust prevails, so that targeted policy 
measures can be pursued to improve the level of trust 
between employers as well as between employers 
and government.
In sum, this paper has revealed the importance 
of the “social actor” approach in both explaining as 
well as tackling the propensity of employers to pay 
envelope wages, and the need for a shift away from 
“rational economic actor” explanations and the as-
sociated deterrence approach that seeks to increase 
the penalties and probability of detection. If this pa-
per stimulates similar research in other countries and 
more in-depth research on the reasons for the lack of 
vertical and horizontal trust, then it will have fulilled a 
primary intention. If this then leads to changes in how 
under-declared employment is tackled, and greater 
emphasis on addressing the low the levels of vertical 
and horizontal trust that lead to higher levels of un-
der-declared employment, then it will have fulilled its 
fuller intention. 
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